NBAR-应对中国经济挑战(英文)-2019.2-40页.pdf
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1、the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #76 | february 2019 answering chinas economic challenge Preserving Power, Enhancing Prosperity By Charles W. Boustany Jr. and Aaron L. Friedberg cover 2 NBR Chairmans Council and Board of Advisors Michael Armacost Stanford University Rodney Bi
2、ndon Bindon and Associates Nicholas Eberstadt American Enterprise Institute Karl Eikenberry Stanford University Donald Emmerson Stanford University Lee Hamilton Indiana University Stephen Hanson College of William and Mary Harry Harding University of Virginia Donald Hellmann University of Washington
3、 Robert J. Herbold The Herbold Group, LLC Carla A. Hills Hills Founding President University of Washington; NBR Jonathan Roberts Founder and Partner Ignition Partners Tom Robertson Vice President and Deputy General Counsel Microsoft Corporation Matt Salmon Vice President of Government Affairs Arizon
4、a State University Scott Stoll (Treasurer) Partner Ernst considers how the U.S. should define its objectives in responding to this challenge; and explores the prospects for negotiating a satisfactory settlement to the current trade standoff. MAIN ARGUMENT The U.S. and China have reached a turning po
5、int in their economic relations and are currently locked in a serious trade skirmish, if not yet a full-blown trade war. Negotiations are ongoing, but the possibility of reaching an agreement that will offer a satisfactory long-term outcome for the U.S. is far from clear. Chinas strategy has been to
6、 engage economically with the world while resisting pressure to transform its political system and economic policies. Chinas leaders view economic policy as an instrument for achieving their grand strategic objectives of preserving the Chinese Communist Partys monopoly on domestic political power an
7、d restoring the country to its historic position as the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia and, eventually, the world. Todays controversies over trade, investment, and technology are thus only one part of a much larger rivalry between competing systems and worldviews, and the current standoff ove
8、r tariffs is only the first skirmish in what seems certain to be a protracted and difficult campaign. POLICY IMPLICATIONS U.S. policy for managing the current standoff with China should include the following elements: Keep up the pressure and resist demands to lift tariffs in return for anything les
9、s than significant, verifiable progress in rolling back Chinas aggressive and market-distorting trade, industrial, and technology promotion policies. The U.S. should not settle for a deal that simply reduces the trade deficit but otherwise codifies the status quo ante. Extend time horizons and mobil
10、ize public support by raising awareness that failure to address challenges now will likely lead to even greater costs in the future. Build maximum aggregate leverage by assembling a coalition of states that share concerns about Chinas predatory policies and unfair trading practices and working with
11、them to establish trade and investment agreements that adhere to high standards. Intensify defensive measures by coordinating with allies and like-minded partners to protect against Chinese economic penetration and exploitation of their national economies. 3 ANSWERING CHINAS ECONOMIC CHALLENGE BOUST
12、ANY AND FRIEDBERG T he United States and China have reached a turning point in their economic relations and perhaps in the broader trajectory of their diplomatic and strategic relationship as well. Since the inauguration of Donald Trump in January 2017, the U.S. government has imposed several rounds
13、 of tariffs on a wide swath of Chinese goods, enhanced scrutiny of potential investments by Chinese firms, and begun to explore ways to tighten controls on the sale or transfer of technology by U.S. companies to their Chinese counterparts. Beijing has responded by raising tariffs on selected U.S. pr
14、oducts. While it has thus far been cautious, Beijing could easily take other measures to interfere with the operations of U.S. companies in China. Following a meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping on December 1, 2018, the two sides announced that they would hold back from imposing tariffs
15、on additional items or raising the levels of tariffs already imposed, allowing a 90-day period for further negotiations. Talks are ongoing, with no clear outcome yet in sight. Washington and Beijing are thus locked in a serious trade skirmish, if not yet a full-blown trade war. Some observers warn t
16、hat current tensions could mark the start of a process of “decoupling,” “disentanglement,” or “divorce” between the worlds two largest economies, the end of the era of engagement, and perhaps even the onset of a new Cold War.1 Along with their more immediate effects on levels of trade and growth, de
17、cisions made in both capitals in the coming months could restructure the global economy and reshape relations between the two Pacific powers for decades to come. What follows is the first of two reports drawing on the deliberations of a taskforce launched by the National Bureau of Asian Research in
18、May 2018 to re-examine the economic dimension of U.S. strategy toward China. Sponsored by a grant from the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the taskforce is a nonpartisan effort, co-chaired by former congressman Dr. Charles Boustany Jr. of Louisiana and Professor Aaron Friedberg of Princeton University, tha
19、t includes over a dozen specialists from a variety of disciplines. The group met five times during the second half of 2018 and will continue its deliberations during the first half of 2019, with a second and final report planned for mid-2019. The goal of the taskforce is to provide answers to four s
20、ets of questions: First, what is the nature of the challenge to U.S. interests posed by China in the economic domain? What are Beijings objectives, how is it seeking to use economic means to achieve them, and what would be the implications for the future security and prosperity of the United States
21、and other countries if it succeeds? Second, in light of these considerations, is a satisfactory negotiated settlement to the current standoff between the United States and China over trade issues feasible? If so, what would it look like and how can it be achieved? Third, what is the likelihood and w
22、hat would be the costs, risks, and potential benefits of at least a partial “disengagement” or “disentanglement” of the U.S. and Chinese economies? Fourth, drawing back from the details of the bilateral trade and investment relationship, how should the U.S. government restructure its institutions an
23、d reshape its policies on taxes, innovation, education, immigration, and other issues so as to engage more effectively in a possibly protracted strategic competition with China? 1 For an early discussion of the prospects for economic disengagement, see Daniel H. Rosen, “A Post-Engagement U.S.-China
24、Relationship?” Rhodium Group Research, January 19, 2018, 4 NBR SPECIAL REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 The first report of the taskforce will address questions one and two; the second report will examine questions three and four. A final note: while we have benefited greatly from the insights and expertise of
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