from asian miracle to asian crisis why vulnerabilitywhy从亚洲奇迹的亚洲金融危机为什么vulnerabilitywhy.pdf
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1、190Jenny Corbett, Gregor Irwin and David VinesFrom Asian Miracle to Asian Crisis: WhyVulnerability, Why Collapse?Jenny Corbett, Gregor Irwin and David Vines*1.IntroductionThe east Asian financial crisis has been truly remarkable: suddenly the Asianmiracle became the Asian crisis.Existing models of c
2、urrency crisis were powerless to explain what happened. Thiswas not a first generation currency crisis brought about by excess budget deficits,as in Krugman (1979). Nor was the crisis caused by a conflict between the austerityneeded to defend a fixed exchange and the expansion needed to remove highu
3、nemployment, as in Britains forced exit from the ERM in 1992 (Eichengreen andWyplosz 1993). To understand whatever happened to Asia, a new third generationanalysis has been needed, one which puts crisis in the financial system atcentre-stage.In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, debate raged abo
4、ut whether thisthird-generation crisis was a problem of panic and collapse, resulting from a shiftfrom a good equilibrium to a bad one (Radelet and Sachs 1998), or, instead, aproblem resulting from a worsening of fundamentals (Krugman 1998a). Krugmanhas generously conceded defeat:1 I was wrong (Krug
5、man 1999a, p. 1). But a panic-and-collapse account of the Asian crisis needs to be underpinned by a story which*We acknowledge helpful comments from participants at the conference, and from those at aconference on International Capital Mobility and Domestic Economic Stability, held in Canberraon 131
6、6 July 1999. Earlier versions of some of the material in this paper appeared in Corbett andVines (1999a; 1999b) and in Irwin and Vines (1999). We are grateful for comments fromparticipants at the Warwick conference on International Capital Markets and InternationalFinancial Crises held on 24 and 25
7、July 1998; from those present at a seminar in the Departmentof Economics, RSPAS, Australian National University in September 1998, in particular Ross McLeod,Ross Garnaut, Bhanupong Nidhiprabha, and Peter Warr; and from Richard Agenor,Barry Eichengreen, and Marcus Miller. We would also like to acknow
8、ledge helpful conversationsin Washington with Charles Adams, Stan Fischer, Timothy Lane and Paul Masson (IMF),Amar Bhattacharya and Joe Stiglitz (World Bank), and Caroline Atkinson (US Treasury). We havealso been influenced by Nick Crafts (1998) and Paul Krugman (1999a). We are grateful too for help
9、from two students of ours at Oxford University: Gordon Menzies and Hwe Loo Tan.1. It is interesting that Michael Dooley was once an implacable opponent of multiple-equilibriumreasoning; one can read the paper which he wrote with Carl Walsh for this volume as a stimulating,and equally generous, recan
10、tation. Dooleys previous views are well summed up as follows. Theabsence of clear thinking on the Asian crisis, and the failure to develop fundamentals-basedmodels which illuminate it, has led to the growth of a plethora of multiple equilibrium models, ofwhich there are too many, none of which are p
11、roperly testable, not least because they do not modelthe data. A return to fundamentals-based models really is advisable, partly in order to re-checkwhether any model exists which will actually fit the data. The modelling challenge now is to try toconstruct a new generation of first generation funda
12、mentals-based models which will meet thistest. Multiple equilibrium models may be mathematically interesting. However they are almostcertainly unnecessary (Global Economic Institutions 1998, p. 14).191From Asian Miracle to Asian Crisis: Why Vulnerability, Why Collapse?explains both why the economies
13、 were vulnerable to a bad equilibrium and why thatequilibrium was so bad. This paper sketches our own candidate for such a story.2The broad argument advanced here takes forward ideas put forward in Corbett andVines (1999a; 1999b), in Irwin and Vines (1999), and in forthcoming work withPeter Warr (Vi
14、nes and Warr 1999). It is still work-in-progress. In essence the ideais that the Asian vulnerability to crisis was the consequence of the Asian miracle. Webelieve that it was the consequence of insufficient institutional development in theregion during the miracle boom period an almost inevitable ou
15、tcome of theflawed process of financial liberalisation which the miracle involved.3 Two keyflaws were, we believe, important. The first was the continuation, into the era ofliberalisation, of a financial system containing implicit guarantees. The second kindwas the continuation, into the era of libe
16、ralisation, of a pegged exchange rate regime.The argument proceeds in two stages, and is illustrated in Figure 1.Figure 12. Dooley and Walsh (this volume) provide a fascinating picture of the expanding universe of suchstories; Krugman (1999a) provides a very particular version of one such story whic
17、h we will use asa key piece of our own account.3. We owe this argument, in such a stark form, to Peter Warr. See Warr (1999). We argue that vulnerability was created by liberalisation in the presence of abank-based financial regime. In such systems there were implicit promises of agovernment bailout
18、 of the financial sector in the event of bad out-turns.Vulnerability meant that negative shocks were capable of precipitating afinancial crisis, by creating obligations for the government to bailout thefinancial sector which were too large for the government to meet. This financialcrisis precipitate
19、d a collapse of investment. The consequence of this was in away to be explained below a large currency devaluation.VulnerabilityInadequately developedfinancial system+liberalisationRiskNegativeshocksCrisisFixed exchange rateRisk of financialcrisisFinancial crisisExchange rate collapsei) Diminishing
20、returnsii) Worsening external positions (quantity and price)iii) Worsening internal position192Jenny Corbett, Gregor Irwin and David Vines We argue that vulnerability was also created by liberalisation in the presence ofa pegged exchange rate regime. This regime led to an overhang of unhedgedforeign
21、-currency borrowing, because of the implicit promise that the exchangerate would not be devalued. As a result countries were exposed to the risk of afinancial crisis whose key aspects were a large fall in investment, a collapse in theexchange rate, a large increase in the value of the overhang of un
22、hedged foreignborrowing, and thus, through this additional route, bailout obligations forgovernments which they could not meet.The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 clarifies the term vulnerability,and then sets out in detail the two stages of the argument summarised above.Section 3 summa
23、rises the negative shocks experienced by the region. Section 4 usesthe material of Sections 2 and 3 to give a stylised account of the crisis. Section 5briefly examines macroeconomic policy in the region, describing why policy bothbefore and during the crisis increased vulnerability. A conclusion pla
24、ces the analysisin historical perspective.2.Asian VulnerabilitiesThe concept of vulnerability is central to what follows. Dornbusch makes themeaning of this term vividly, if imprecisely, clear when he says vulnerabilitymeans that if something goes wrong, then suddenly a lot goes wrong (Dornbusch1997
25、, p. 21). In general terms the idea is bound up with non-linearity: a state of affairsis vulnerable when, even if there are only small changes in fundamentals, there canbe a big shift to some sort of bad outcome.There are many ways of making this general idea specific, as Dooley and Walsh(this volum
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