美中技术“脱钩”:一个战略和政策框架(英)-美国智库-2022.4.pdf
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1、U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL“DECOUPLING”A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORKJON BATEMANWith Foreword by Eric Schmidt 2022 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.All rights reserved.Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues;the views represented herein are those of the author(
2、s)and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie,its staff,or its trustees.No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Please direct inquiries to:Carnegie Endowment fo
3、r International PeacePublications Department1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington,DC 20036P:+1 202 483 7600F:+1 202 483 1840CarnegieEndowment.orgThis publication can be downloaded at no cost at CarnegieEndowment.org.TABLE OF CONTENTSAbout the Author vAbbreviations viiForeword ixExecutive Summary 1T
4、he Evolution of U.S.Thinking and Policy 9Choosing a Strategy 35Translating Strategy Into Policy and Process 53Maintaining a Military Edge Over China 57Limiting Chinese National Security Espionage 65Preventing Chinese Sabotage in a Crisis 73Limiting Chinese Influence Operations 81Denying Support for
5、Chinese and China-Enabled Authoritarianism and Repression 87Countering Unfair Chinese Economic Practices and Intellectual Property Theft 97Competing and Leading in Strategic Industries 105Obtaining General Leverage Over China 113Shaping U.S.Domestic Narratives 117Conclusion 121Notes 123Carnegie Endo
6、wment for International Peace 163v Jon Bateman is a fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.He previously worked as a senior intelligence analyst,policy adviser,and speechwriter in the U.S.Department of Defense,most recently servin
7、g as special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author is deeply grateful to George Perkovich for his patient guidance and penetrat-ing reviews of this report throughout its development.Special thanks also go to Marjory Blumenthal,Tom Carothers,Mark Chandler,C
8、hris Chivvis,Tino Cullar,Doug Farrar,Steve Feldstein,Sarah Gordon,Yukon Huang,Jim Miller,Mike Nelson,Matt Sheehan,Stephen Wertheim,and Tong Zhao for their valuable written feedback on drafts.Conversations with many othersin government,the private sector,academia,and civil societyhelped to test and s
9、harpen the reports underlying ideas.Thanks are also owed to Evan Burke,Emeizmi Mandagi,Nikhil Manglik,and Arthur Nelson for research assistance,and to Isabella Furth,Natalie Brase,Jocelyn Soly,and Amy Mellon for editing and design.This report is the authors sole responsibility and does not represent
10、 the views of any other person or institution.The research for and writing of this report were supported by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.Editorial production and dissemination were supported by a grant from Schmidt Futures.ABOUT THE AUTHORvii ABBREVIATIONSAI Artificial intelligenceCBP Cu
11、stoms and Border ProtectionCCL Commerce Control ListCFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United StatesDHS Department of Homeland SecurityDOD Department of DefenseEAR Export Administration RegulationsECRA Export Control Reform ActFCC Federal Communications CommissionFIRRMA Foreign Investment
12、Risk Review Modernization ActIC Intelligence CommunityICTS Information and communications technology or servicesIEEPA International Emergency Economic Powers Actviii U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL“DECOUPLING”:A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK INA Immigration and Nationality ActITAR International Traffic in
13、Arms RegulationsMEU Military End UserNSC National Security CouncilPLA Peoples Liberation ArmyPRC Peoples Republic of ChinaR&D Research and developmentSDN Specially Designated NationalsSEC Securities and Exchange CommissionSTEM Science,technology,engineering,and mathematicsUSITC U.S.International Tra
14、de CommissionUSML U.S.Munitions ListUSTR U.S.Trade RepresentativeWTO World Trade Organizationix FOREWORDTechnology is the engine that powers superpowers.As the chair of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence(NSCAI),I led the effort that ultimately delivered a harsh message to th
15、e U.S.Congress and to the administration:America is not prepared to defend or compete in the AI era.The fact is that America has been technologically domi-nant for so long that some U.S.leaders came to take it for granted.They were wrong.A second technological superpower,China,has emerged.It happene
16、d with such astonishing speed that were all still straining to understand the implications.Washington has awakened to find the United States deeply technologically enmeshed with its chief long-term rival.America built those technology ties over many years and for lots of good reasons.Chinas tech sec
17、tor continues to benefit American businesses,universities,and citizens in myriad waysproviding critical skilled labor and revenue to sustain U.S.R&D,for example.But that same Chinese tech sector also powers Beijings military build-up,unfair trade practices,and repressive social control.What should w
18、e do about this?In Washington,many people I talk to give a similar answer.They say that some degree of technological separation from China is necessary,but we shouldnt go so far as to harm U.S.interests in the process.Thats exactly right,of course,but its also pretty vague.How partial should this pa
19、rtial separation bewould 15 percent of U.S.-China technological ties be severed,or 85 percent?Which technologies would fall on either side of the cut line?And what,really,is the strategy for Americas long-term tech-nology relationship with China?The further I probe,the less clarity and consensus I f
20、ind.x U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL“DECOUPLING”:A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK In fairness,these are serious dilemmas.Theyre also unfamiliar.“Decoupling”entered the Washington lexicon just a few years ago,and it represents a dramatic break from earlier assumptions.In 2018,for example,I remarked that the
21、 global internet would probably bifurcate into a Chinese-led internet and a U.S.-led internet.Back then,this idea was still novel enough that the comment made headlines around the world.Now,the prediction has already come halfway true.Meanwhile,policymakerswho usually arent technologistshave scrambl
22、ed to educate themselves about the intricate global supply chains that still link the United States,China,and many other countries.In 2019,I was appointed to be the chair of the NSCAI,a congressionally mandated bipar-tisan commission that was charged with“considering the methods and means necessary
23、to advance the development of artificial intelligence,machine learning,and associated tech-nologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States.”1 I worked with leaders in industry,academia,and government to formulate recom-mendations that would be adopted
24、 by Congress,the administration,and departments and agencies.We were successful,but this effort did not go far enough.That is why I continue to advocate for major legislation(such as the United States Innovation and Competition Act and the America COMPETES Act),to develop the next phase of implement
25、able policy options(through the recently launched Special Competitive Studies Project),to support bold and ambitious research on the hardest AI problems(via my new AI2050 initiative),and to el-evate public discussion(in my latest book,The Age of AI,with Henry Kissinger and Daniel Huttenlocher).Still
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