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1、Transparency and Corporate GovernanceMAuthor: Benjamin HamelinAbstractAn objective of many proposed corporate governance reforms is increased transparency. This goal has been relatively uncontroversial, as most observers believe increased transparency to be unambiguously good. We argue that, from a
2、corporate governance perspective, there are likely to be both costs and benefits to increased transparency, leading to an optimum level beyond which increasing transparency lowers profits. This result holds even when there is no direct cost of increasing transparency and no issue of revealing inform
3、ation to regulators or product-market rivals. We show that reforms that seek to increase transparency can reduce firm profits, raise executive compensation, and inefficiently increase the rate of CEO turnover. We further consider the possibility that executives will take actions to distort informati
4、on. We show that executives could have incentives, due to career concerns, to increase transparency and that increases in penalties for distorting information can be profit reducing.1 IntroductionsIn response to recent corporate governance scandals, governments have responded by adopted a number of
5、regulatory changes. One component of these changes has been increased disclosure requirements. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley(sox), adopted in response to Enron, WorldCom, and other public governance failures, required detailed reporting of off-balance sheet financing and special purpose entities. Addi
6、tionally, sox increased the penalties to executives for misreporting. The link between governance and transparency is clear in the publics (and regulators) perceptions; transparency was increased fbr the purpose of improving governance.Yet, most academic discussions about transparency have nothing t
7、o do with corporate governance. The most commonly discussed benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetric information, and hence lowers the cost of trading the firms securities and the firms cost of capital. To offset this benefit, commentators typically focus on the direct costs of disclosu
8、re, as well as the competitive costs arising because the disclosure provides potentially useful information to product-market rivals. While both of these factors are undoubtedly important considerations in firms disclosure decisions, they are not particularly related to corporate governance.In this
9、paper, we provide a framework for understanding the role of transparency in corporate governance. We analyze the effect that disclosure has on the contractual and monitoring relationship between the board and the CEO. We view the quality of information the firm discloses as a choice variable that af
10、fects the contracts the firm and its managers. Through its impact on corporate governance, higher quality disclosure both provides benefits and imposes costs. The benefits reflect the fact that more accurate information about performance allows boards to make better personnel decisions about their e
11、xecutives. The costs arise because executives have to be compensated for the increased risk to their careers implicit in higher disclosure levels, as well as for the incremental costs they incur trying to distort information in equilibrium. These costs and benefits complement existing explanations f
12、or disclosure. Moreover, because they are directly about corporate governance, they are in line with common perceptions of why firms disclose information.We formalize this idea through an extension of Hamelin and Wasatch (1998) and Hamelins (2005) adaptation of Hailstorms (1999) career-concerns mode
13、l to consider the question of optimal transparency. Section 2 lays out the basics of this model, in which the company chooses the “quality of the performance measure that directors use to assess the CEOs ability. In this model, the optimal quality of information for the firm to reveal can be zero, i
14、nfinite, or a finite positive value depending on the parameters. When we calibrate the model to reflect actual publicly traded large us corporations, we find that the parameters implied by the calibration lead to a finite value fbr optimal disclosure quality. Thus, our analysis suggests that disclos
15、ure requirements going beyond this optimal level are likely to have unintended consequences and to reduce value.We evaluate the implications of penalties and incentives that potentially affect the motives of CEOs to distort the information coming from their firms. Measures that punish exaggerating e
16、ffort can be effective if they are sufficiently severe to curtail this effort; however, relatively minor penalties can be counterproductive. In addition, incentives fbr CEOs to improve the accuracy of information can harm shareholders because such incentives push a CEO to disclose more than the valu
17、e-maximizing quantity of information.2 Concealing InformationIn light of some recent corporate scandals, one concern is not that executives distort information, but rather that they conceal it. In this subsection, we briefly address what our analysis can say with respect to concealing information. O
18、ne question is whether the other players know if the CEO has concealed information? If so, then presumably they can punish the CEO for non-disclosure Moreover, if it is common knowledge that the CEO knows the value of signals that he conceals, then an unraveling argument (Grossman, 1981)applies: Wha
19、tever the inferred expected value of unrevealed signals is, the CEO will have an incentive to reveal those above that expected value. Hence, the only equilibrium is one in which unrevealed signals are inferred to have Ihe lowest possible value and the CEO is correspondingly induced to reveal all sig
20、nals. We predict therefore that concealment is unlikely to be an issue if the other players know what the set of signals is.Suppose, in contrast, that the other players did not know what the complete set of signals was(e.g., the set varies over time).If the CEO did not know the realized value when h
21、e deciding to reveal or conceal a signal, then he would wish to conceal all signals that he could: more signals means a more precise posterior estimate of his ability, which means greater career risk for him. Our model, thus, predicts that when (i) the CEO has discretion over what signals are reveal
22、ed and (ii) must commit to reveal or conceal prior to learning the value of the signals, he will choose to commit to conceal all signals over which he has discretion.If, instead, the CEO is not committed to a disclosure decision prior to learning the value of the signals, then he will be tempted to
23、reveal those that arc favorable to him. The other players will infer that they are getting a biased sample and, thus, make a downward adjustment. In this sense, the situation is similar to that of exaggerating effort. The details of the analysis are, to be sure, different and await future analysis,
24、but our general conclusions will generally hold.3 Discussions and ConclusionMost corporate governance reforms involve increased transparency. Yet, discussions of disclosure generally focus on issues other than governance, such as the cost of capital and product-market competition. The logic of how t
25、ransparency potentially affects governance is absent from the academic literature.Wc provide such analysis in this paper. We show that the level of transparency can be understood as deriving from the governance relation between the CEO and the board of directors. The directors set the level of trans
26、parency (e.g., amount and quality of disclosure) and it is, thus, part of an endogenously chosen governance arrangement.Increasing transparency provides benefits to the firm, but entails costs as well. Better transparency improves the boards monitoring of the CEO by providing it with an improved sig
27、nal about his quality. But better transparency is not free: The better able the market is to leam about the CEOs ability, the greater the risk to which the CEO is exposed. In our setting, the profit-maximizing level of transparency requires balancing these two factors.Our model implies that there ca
28、n be an optimal level of transparency. Consequently, attempts to mandate levels beyond this optimum decrease profits. Profits decrease both because managers will have to be paid higher salaries to compensate them for the increased career risk they face, and because greater transparency increases man
29、agerial incentives to engage in costly and counterproductive efforts to distort information. We emphasize that these effects occur in a model in which all other things equal, better information disclosure increases firm value.One key assumption we make throughout the paper is that the board relies o
30、n the same information that is released to the public in making its monitoring decisions. Undoubtedly, this assumption is literally false in most firms, as the board has access to better information than the public. Nonetheless, CEOs do have incentives to manipulate information transfers to improve
31、the boards perception of them, and this idea has been an important factor in a number of recent studies(see, c.g., Adams and Ferreira, in press).In addition, in a number of publicized cases, boards have been kept in the dark except through their ability to access publicly disclosed documents; the ci
32、rcumstances in which boards must rely on publicly available information are likely the cases in which the board-CEO relationship is most adversarial, and hence are the cases in which board monitoring is likely most important. Certainly, our basic assumption that the quality of public disclosure has
33、a large impact on the boards ability to monitor management is plausible.Our model is set in the context of a board that is perfectly aligned with shareholders? interests. One could equally well apply it to direct monitoring by shareholders. If there were an increase in the quality of available infor
34、mation either due to more stringent reporting requirements or because of better analysis (e.g., of the sort performed by institutional investors or a more attentive press),then our model contains clear empirical predictions. In particular, it suggests that consequences of improved information would
35、be increases in CEO salaries and the rate of CEO turnover. In fact, both CEO salaries and CEO turnover have increased substantially starting in the 1990s, with at least some scholars5 attributing the increase to the higher level of press scrutiny and investor activism (see Kaplan and Minton, 2006).T
36、his pattern of CEO salaries and turnover is consistent with our model; moreover, it is consistent with the idea that better information has both costs and benefits through itsimpact on corporate governance.Some issues remain. As discussed above, we have only scratched the surface with respect to iss
37、ues of managerial concealment of information. We have abstracted away from any of the concerns about revealing information to rivals or regulators that earlier work has raised. We have also ignored other competing demands for better information, such as to help better resolve the principal-agent pro
38、blem through incentive contracts (see e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983, Singh, 2004).Finally, we have ignored the mechanics of how the firm actually makes information more or less informative (e.g., what accounting rules are used, what organizational structures, such as reporting lines and office organ
39、ization, are employed, etc.).While future attention to such details will, we believe, shed additional light on the subject, we remain confident that our general results will continue to hold.译文透亮度与公司治理资料来源:哈佛商学院教育网 作者:本杰明埃尔马兰,迈克尔魏斯巴赫1摘要很多提出的关于公司治理改革的目标是提高透亮度。这个目标已比较不会引起争议,由于大多数观看家认为提高透亮度还是清晰明确的比较好。我
40、们认为,从公司治理的角度来看,可能存在着成本与效益均提高 了透亮度,导致超过其最佳水平即提高了透亮度却降低了利润。这一结果认为,即使没有提高透亮度的直接成本,也没有向监管机构或产品市场竞争对手信息披露的问题。我们的分析表明,改革旨在提高 透亮度可以削减公司利润,提高管理层薪资水平并提高缺乏力量的首席执行官的离职率。我们应进一步考虑存在着行政管理人员将实行措施来扭曲信息的可能性。我们的分析表明,由于就业问题管理人员就可以有动力,提 高透亮度和增加信息的扭曲,从而增加罚金降低利润。2论文简介对于最近的公司治理丑闻,各国政府已作出回应,并实行了一系列的监管 调整措施。这些调整措施的一个组成部分是提高
41、信息披露要求。例如,萨班斯- 奥克斯利法案说明,应对安稳、世通和其他公共治理的失败,要求对资产负债 表表外融资和特殊目的实体进行具体报告。此外,萨班斯-奥克斯利法案中提出 增加了管理人员误报的惩罚。关于治理与透亮度之间的关系,公众和监管机构的看法是明确的,即增加透亮度是为了提高治理。然而,大多数关于透亮度的学术争论认为透亮度与公司治理没有关系。最常见的关于信息透亮度的好处的争论认为它削减了信息不对称,从而降低了公司证券的交易成本和公司的资本成本。为了 弥补这个优势,评论家通常集中在信息披露的直接费用以及产生的竞争力成本 上,由于披露可能为产品市场竞争者供应有用的信息。而这两个因素在公司信 息披
42、露的打算中无疑是重要的考虑因素,它们并不特殊与公司治理相关。在本文中,我们供应了一个了解透亮度在公司治理中的作用的框架。我们分析了信息披露在合同方面以及董事会与首席执行官之间的监测方 面的作用。我们认为公司信息披露质量作为选择变量影响了合同的企业及其管 理者。通过其对公司治理的影响,更高质量的信息披露能供应效益和强加的成 本。这些效益反映的事实是更精确的业绩信息能促使董事会做出更好的关于他们的管理人员的人事打算。这些成本的产生是由于管理人员在较高 的隐性披露水平常必需取得增加他们事业风险的赔偿,以及他们试图歪曲平衡 的信息引发的增量成本。这些成本和效益补充了披露的现有解释。此外,由于 他们直接
43、对企业进行治理,在与公司为什么要披露信息的公共看法全都。我们正式通过埃尔马兰,魏兹巴赫(1998),埃尔马兰(2005)扩展了霍 姆斯特罗姆(1999)的职业生涯关注模型的适应性的想法是考虑了最优透亮 度的问题。其次章展现了最基本的模型,在该公司选择绩效的“质量”指标来 衡量,从而使董事用来评估首席执行官的力量。在这个模型中,公司的信息披 露质量最优可以是零,无限的,或一个有限价值取决于参数。当我们校准模型 来反映我们的实际大型上市公司,我们发觉所示意的参数校准导致最优信息披 露质量的有限价值。因此,我们的分析表明,信息披露要求超出了这个最佳水 平很可能产生意想不到的后果,并削减价值。我们评估
44、的惩处和嘉奖可能影响首席执行官的动机去扭曲他们企业的信 息。惩处措施夸大了工作的有效性,假如他们能足够遏制这一努力的话;然而, 相对较轻的惩罚可能会适得其反。此外,为了提高信息的精确性,首席执行官们的嘉奖可能会损害股东利益,由于这种激励措施推动首席执行官 透露的信息价值最大化的数量更多。3隐蔽信息在最近的一些公司丑闻的曝光中,关怀的不是管理人员歪曲信息,而是隐 蔽信息。在本小节中,我们简洁谈谈我们的分析可以说是关于隐瞒信息。一个 问题是,假如首席执行官隐蔽了信息是否其他参加者都知道?假如是这样,那 么他们也许可以惩处就非公开的首席执行官。此外,假如众所周知,首席执行 官知道他隐蔽的信号值,进而
45、阐明参数(格罗斯曼,1981)适用于:凡是未显 露信号推断预期值时,首席执行官将有动机透露上述那些预期的价值。因此, 唯一的均衡是指未透露的信号推断出的可能最低价值和首席执行官相应的诱导 显示全部的信号。因此,我们猜测隐瞒不太可能是一个问题,假如其他参加者 知道什么是信号集合。假设,与此相反,其他参加者不知道什么是一套完整的信号(例如,随时 间的变化而异)。假如首席执行官在打算显示或隐蔽一个信号时,不知道实现价 值,那么他就会想要隐蔽他的全部信号:更多的信号是指以更精确的方法估量 出的他的力量,这意味着他的职业风险更大。因此,我们的模型猜测,(一)当 首席执行官打算揭示什么信号,(二)必需承诺
46、事先学习显示或隐蔽的信号价值, 他会选择隐瞒承诺过的全部信号。相反,假如首席执行官不承诺在作出信息披露打算前学习的信号的价值, 那么他将诱导揭示那些对他有利的信息号。其他参加者将推断出他们获得到一 个偏差的样本,从而做一个向下调整。在这个意义上说,这种状况是类似的“夸 大成果二依据分析的细节,可以确定的是需要等待将来的不同分析,但我们 普遍的结论通常会保留。4争论与结论大多数公司治理改革涉及提高透亮度。然而,信息披露的争论通常集中在披露问题上除了治理问题,如资本成本和产品市场竞争成本。透亮 度如何潜在地影响治理的规律己经在学术文献中缺席了。本文中我们供应这样的分析。我们的分析表明,透亮度水平可
47、以理解为由首席执行官与董事会之间的关系产生的治理。董事们设置透亮 度水平(例如,透亮度的量与质),因此,选择了一种内在的治理支配的一部分。提高透亮度为公司带来了利益,但也需要成本。通过提高他的质量的信号来供应更好的透亮度,从而提高董事会对首席执行官的监测力量。但是更好的透亮度不是免费的:更好的市场能够了解首席执行官的力量,并且首席执行官会暴露更大的风险。在我们的设定中,透亮 度的利润最大化水平需要平衡这两个因素。我们的模型表明有一个透亮度的最佳水平。因此,试图超越这个最佳水平会降低利润。利润的削减一方面是由于管理者将不得不支付更高的 工资,以弥补他们所面临的更大职业风险,另一方面是由于更高的透
48、亮 度鼓舞管理者从事昂贵的,产生反效果的工作来歪曲信息。我们强调,在一个 模型中的影响在其他条件都相同的状况下,更好的信息披露提高公司的价值。我们通过论文提出的一个关键的假设是董事会在做出监察打算时依靠于向 公众发布相同的信息。毫无疑问,这种假设在大多数公司里的确是虚假的,由 于董事会已经获得了比公众信息更好的信息。不过,首席执行官们有动机操纵 信息的传输以提高董事会对他们的看法,而且这一理念在最近的一些争论中被 认为是一个重要的因素(例如,亚当斯和费雷拉,印刷中)。此外,在一些公 开的案例中,董事会被蒙在鼓里除非通过自己的力量获得公开披露的文件;在 何种状况下,董事会必需依靠公开的可用信息,
49、可能是在董事会与首席执行官 的关系是最抗拒时,因此,在这种状况下董事会监仔可能是最重要的。当然, 我们的基本假设是公开披露质量对董事会监督管理者的力量的巨大影响是有理 的。我们的模型设定在董事与股东的利益完全全都的状况下。人们可以将它应 用于同样也由股东直接监控的公司。假如有一个可用信息质量的提高要么是由 于更严格的报告要求,要么是由于更好的分析(例如,由机构投资者或更细心 地出版社整理分析),那么我们的模型包含清晰的实证的猜测。特殊的是,它表 明改进信息将提高首席执行官的薪酬和离职率。事实上,首席执行官的薪酬离 职率的提高大体上开头于20世纪90年月,至少有一些学者认为应增加新闻审查 和提高投资者的乐观性(卡普兰,明顿,2006)。这种模式的首席执行官的薪水 和离职率与我们的模型是全都的;而且,它的全都观点是更好的信息对公司治 理的影响既有成本又有效益。但有些问题任然存在,如上所述,我们只是涉及了有关管理的信息隐蔽的 表面问题。我们已经忽视了早期工作中涉及向竞争对手和监管机构提出的披露 信息。我们也忽视了其他竞争者需要更好的信息,例如通过激励契约来关心更 好
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