国际事务研究院-意大利的“一带一路”倡议:热那亚和的里雅斯特的港口(英文)-2021.5-20正式版.doc
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1、ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-191-9 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 17 - APRIL 2021The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy:The Ports of Genoa and Triesteby Francesca GhirettiABSTRACTIn March 2019, Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in support of PRC P
2、resident Xi Jinpings flagship infrastructure and connectivity project, the Belt and Road Initiative. The MoU was accompanied by a series of commercial agreements, including two between the ports of Genoa and Trieste and the state-owned enterprise China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). The
3、 European Union and the United States expressed concerns about the agreements as they feared thatCCCC would eventually obtain a controlling share of the ports, not unlike that recently secured by the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) with Greeces Port of Piraeus. However, existing legal constrain
4、ts, an open international and national debate, and the vague nature of the agreements concerned have so far kept these fears from materialising.China | Italy | Infrastructures | PortskeywordsISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-191-9 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 17 - APRIL 2021The Belt and Road Initiative i
5、n Italy: The Ports of Genoa and TriesteThe Belt and Road Initiative in Italy:The Ports of Genoa and Triesteby Francesca Ghiretti*IntroductionPorts and maritime infrastructures are some of the core elements of Chinas connectivity-boosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in that they help the Peoples
6、Republic to access foreign markets and gain more control of trade routes.1 As such, BRI-related deals involving ports have been a special focus of the debate, and concerns, surrounding the Initiative.The greater relevance of Northern European ports over those in Southern Europe has long been a fact.
7、 Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Antwerp in Belgium and Hamburg in Germany have been thriving for decades as Europes main maritime hubs, and future access to the Arctic route has the potential to further strengthen their position. This, to a certain extent, might come at the expense of other European
8、ports.Yet, in recent years, Southern European ports have received growing attention. Their new attractiveness can be traced to two factors: the expansion of the Suez Canal, which has increased the volume of trade into and from the Mediterranean; and Chinese investments in maritime infrastructures in
9、 Southern Europe. The Suez Canal development was completed in 2016, the same year that China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) acquired 51 per cent of the Port of Piraeus in Greece.2 The latter is the origin of most concerns regarding Chinese investments in European ports and, specifically, those locat
10、ed in Southern Europe. The argument1 Jonathan Holslag, The Silk Road Trap. How Chinas Trade Ambitions Challenge Europe, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2019, p. 97.2 Kerin Hope, “Greece Picks Chinas Cosco in Port Deal”, in Financial Times, 20 January 2016, https:/ * Francesca Ghiretti is a researcher at th
11、e Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome and a Leverhulme doctoral fellow at Kings College London. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy embraces the BRI”, which aims to analyse the development of BRI agreements in Italy.2ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-191-9 2021 IAII
12、AI PAPERS 21 | 17 - APRIL 2021The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Triesteruns that China is strategically investing in these facilities, which are often going through difficulties or are underdeveloped, in order to control the routes of the New Maritime Silk Road part of th
13、e broader BRI. The contention is that by doing so, China wins a strategic advantage over other countries commercially and, potentially, politically.It should come as no surprise that when Italy and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the framework of the
14、 Belt and Road Initiative in March 2019, concerns in Europe and the United States mounted.3 The fact that two of the 28 agreements4 under the broader MoU concerned partnerships between the Port of Genoa, under the Western Ligurian Sea Port Authority (WLSPA), and the Port of Trieste, under the Easter
15、n Adriatic Sea Port Authority (EASPA), with China Communications Construction Company(CCCC) further cemented such worries.5 Two years after the signing of the MoU, the time is ripe for a preliminary assessment of its consequences for Italy.1. The Belt and Road Initiative: A risk for Italy?The BRI is
16、 a much-publicised (and criticised) connectivity project launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the contents of which have always been somewhat unclear leaving much room for interpretation, and speculation. A common reading has it that the BRI is (a) a global development plan, (b) Chinas
17、plan for geostrategic and geo-economic expansion, (c) Chinas way to manage (for which, read dump) domestic overproduction or a combination of all these factors.There are four main issues of concern surrounding the BRI. First, the above-mentioned lack of clarity about what the Initiative aims to achi
18、eve has left room for speculation and increasing distrust in China itself. Second, most BRI projects are conducted by Chinese enterprises and financed by Chinese banks, with very little participation by local or international actors, which only strengthens the concern that the BRI solely plays to Ch
19、inas advantage. Third, it has been claimed that the PRC compels governments that are unable to repay its generous loans to cede national assets the infamous “debt trap”. Even if the last-named issue were a deliberate strategy, it is worth emphasising that the debt trap has been “sprung”3 Italy and C
20、hina, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on Cooperation within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, 22 March 2019, http:/ www.governo.it/sites/gover
21、no.it/files/Memorandum_Italia-Cina_EN.pdf.4 In the majority of cases, included those of Genoa and Trieste, the agreements are also Memoranda of Understanding. To avoid confusion with the MoU signed by Italy and the Chinese, they will be referred to as agreements unless specified otherwise in the tex
22、t.5 Italian Government, Lista delle intese commerciali presentate a Villa Madama. Visita di Stato del Presidente cinese Xi Jinping (22-23 marzo 2019), http:/www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Intese_ commerciali_Italia-Cina.pdf.3ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-191-9 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 17 -
23、 APRIL 2021The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Triesteonly in a handful of cases all of them in developing economies. For example, evidence shows that China has been attempting to renegotiate debts rather than ask for assets as has been well explained in a report from the R
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