研究生英语阅读教育教案(提高级第三版)教师用书课本知识及课后习题标准答案.doc

.* 新编研究生英语系列教程 研究生英语阅读教程 （提高级/第三版） Lesson 1　Spillonomics: Underestimating Risk 1 Lesson 2　Humbled by Nature, Humble by Culture 9 Lesson 3　How We Broke the Murdoch Scandal14 Unit Two Reading Biographies and Personal Recollections Lesson 4 BillClinton21 Lesson 5　Steve Jobs39 Lesson 6　A Beautiful Mind42 Unit Three Reading Essays Lesson 7　A Christmas Sermon on Peace57 Lesson 8　Left for Dead64 Lesson 9　Spell of the Rising Moon68 Unit Four Reading Scientific and Technical Articles Lesson 10OurPicture of the Universe74 Lesson 11　Mind over Machine87 Lesson 12　2 Inches Between Life, Death95 Unit Five Reading Short Stories and Novels Lesson 13　Cat in the Rain101 Lesson 14　The Stolen Party106 Lesson 15　A Summer’s Reading109 课文全文参考译文 113 Unit One Reading News Reports Lesson 1　Spillonomics: Underestimating Risk KEYS TO EXERCISES . Reading Comprehension A. 1. B (Paragraph 1: Years before the Deepwater Horizon rig blew, BP was developing a reputation as an oil company that took safety risks to save money.) 2. C (Paragraph 1: None other than Joe Barton, a Republican congressman from Texas and a global-warming skeptic… none other than: used to emphasize the surprising identity of a person or thing 正是，恰是) 3. D (Paragraph 4: For all the criticism BP executives may deserve, they are far from the only people to struggle with such low-probability, high-cost events. Nearly everyone does.) 4. B (Paragraph 4: When an event is difficult to imagine, we tend to underestimate its likelihood. This is the proverbial black swan.) 5. C (Paragraph 6: After the 9/11 attacks, Americans canceled plane trips and took to the road. There were no terrorist attacks in this country in 2002, yet the additional driving apparently led to an increase in traffic fatalities.) 6. B (Paragraph 7: When the stakes are high enough, it falls to government to help its citizens avoid these entirely human errors. The market, left to its own devices, often cannot do so.) 7. D (Paragraph 8: Federal law helped them underestimate the costs.) 8. A (Paragraph 10: The big financial risk is no longer a housing bubble. Instead, it may be the huge deficits that the growth of Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security will cause in coming years—and the possibility that lenders will eventually become nervous about extending credit to Washington.) 9. A (Paragraph 12: Nothing like that has ever happened before. Even imagining it is difficult. It is much easier to hope that the odds of such an outcome are vanishingly small. In fact, it’s only natural to have this hope. But that doesn’t make it wise.) 10. D (The whole text.) B. Reasons Behind Wrong Actions Consequences Suggested Solutions Deepwater Horizon Obsession with profits Cost cutting BP should be fully aware of Safety could not be the potential risks and spend guaranteed more money to make their Human weakness Underestimating the risks facilities safer. Congress and the Obama administration should take A 1990 Congress law put a Federal law helped BP sensible steps, like lifting Government policy cap on spiller’s liability for executives underestimate the liability cap and freeing cleanup cost at $75 million. the costs of damages. regulators from the sway of industry. . Vocabulary Ⅱ A. 1. C　　2. B　　3. C　　4. B　　5. A　　6. D　　7. D　　8. D　　9. C　　10. A B. 1. cap 2. In the wake of 3. proverbial 4. stem from 5. odds 6. given 7. come what may 8. Far from 9. sway 10. In retrospect Ⅲ. Cloze 1. wisdom 2. tend 3. shrink 4. unexpected 5. puzzle 6. came up with 7. severe 8. altered 9. Regardless of 10. necessarily Ⅳ. Translation 1. 就连乔 巴顿，对全球变暖持怀疑态度、来自得克萨斯州的共和党众议员，都谴责BP 管理人员“对安全和环境问题表现得漠不关心”。 2. 显然，考虑到清理费用和对BP 声誉的影响，高管们真希望可以回到过去，多花些钱让“深水地平线”更安全。他们没有增加这笔费用就表明他们认为钻机在当时的状态下不会出问题。 3. 埃克森公司瓦尔迪兹漏油事件发生后，在1990 年的一个法案很少引人注意的一项条款中，美国国会将钻机泄漏清理费用的责任上限定为7 500 万美元。即使对旅游业、渔业等造成的经济损失高达数十亿美元，责任方也仅需要支付7 500 万美元。 4. 不过，如果认为我们目前仍然低估的只是那些突然间引人注目的风险，那是非常愚蠢的。 Ⅴ. Oral Practice and Discussion 1. What are the two basic and opposite types of mistakes we humans tend to make? We make two basic—and opposite—types of mistakes. When an event is difficult to imagine, we tend to underestimate its likelihood. On the other hand, when an unlikely event is all too easy to imagine, we often go in the opposite direction and overestimate the odds. 2. What lessons should we learn from the Deepwater Horizon? Open. 3. At the time of maximizing profits, what else should a responsible company do? 4. What are the challenges in developing the economy without harming the environment? MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE TEXT 1. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill: (also referred to as the BP oil spill, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, the BP oil disaster, or the Macondo blowout) an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico which flowed for three months in 2010. It is the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. The spill stemmed from a sea-floor oil gusher that resulted from the April 20, 2010, explosion of Deepwater Horizon, which drilled on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. The explosion killed 11 men working on the platform and injured 17 others. On July 15, 2010, the leak was stopped by capping the gushing wellhead, after it had released about 4.9 million barrels (780,000 m3) of crude oil. An estimated 53,000 barrels per day (8,400 m3/d) escaped from the well just before it was capped. It is believed that the daily flow rate diminished over time, starting at about 62,000 barrels per day (9,900 m3/d) and decreasing as the reservoir of hydrocarbons feeding the gusher was gradually depleted. On September 19, 2010, the relief well process was successfully completed, and the federal government declared the well “effectively dead”. In August 2011, oil and oil sheen covering several square miles of water were reported surfacing not far from BP’s Macondo well. Scientific analysis confirmed the oil is a chemical match for Macondo 252. The Coast Guard said the oil was too dispersed to recover. The spill caused extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and to the Gulf’s fishing and tourism industries. Skimmer ships, floating containment booms, anchored barriers, sand- filled barricades along shorelines, and dispersants were used in an attempt to protect hundreds of miles of beaches, wetlands, and estuaries from the spreading oil. Scientists also reported immense underwater plumes of dissolved oil not visible at the surface as well as an 80-square-mile (210 km) “kill zone” surrounding the blown well. In late November 2010, 4,200 square miles (11,000 km) of the Gulf were re-closed to shrimping after tar balls were found in shrimpers’ nets. The amount of Louisiana shoreline affected by oil grew from 287 miles (462 km) in July to 320 miles (510 km) in late November 2010. In January 2011, an oil spill commissioner reported that tar balls continue to wash up, oil sheen trails are seen in the wake of fishing boats, wetlands marsh grass remains fouled and dying, and crude oil lies offshore in deep water and in fine silts and sands onshore. A research team found oil on the bottom of the seafloor in late February 2011 that did not seem to be degrading. On May 26, 2011, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality extended the state of emergency related to the oil spill. By July 9, 2011, roughly 491 miles (790kilometers) of coastline in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida remained contaminated by BP oil, according to a NOAA spokesperson. In October 2011, a NOAA report shows dolphins and whales continue to die at twice the normal rate. In January 2011 the White House oil spill commission released its final report on the causes of the oil spill. They blamed BP and its partners for making a series of cost-cutting decisionsand the lack of a system to ensure well safety. They also concluded that the spill was not an isolated incident caused by “rogue industry or government officials”, but that “the root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur”. After its own internal probe, BP admitted that it made mistakes which led to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. In June 2010 BP set up a $20 billion fund to compensate victims of the oil spill. To July 2011, the fund has paid $4.7 billion to 198,475 claimants. In all, the fund has nearly 1 million claims and continues to receive thousands of claims each week. In September 2011, the U.S. government published its final investigative report on the accident. In essence, that report states that the main cause was the defective cement job, and Halliburton, BP and Transocean were, in different ways, responsible for the accident. 2. The Prudhoe Bay oil spill: (2006 Alaskan oil spill) an oil spill that was discovered on March 2, 2006 at a pipeline owned by BP Exploration, Alaska (BPXA) in western Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Initial estimates said that up to 267,000 U.S. gallons (6,400 bbl) were spilled over 1.9 acres (7,700 m2), making it the largest oil spill on Alaska’s north slope to date. Alaska’s unified command ratified the volume of crude oil spilled as 212,252 U.S. gallons (5,053.6 bbl) in March 2008. The spill originated from a 0.25-inch (0.64 cm) hole in a 34-inch (86 cm) diameter pipeline. The pipeline was decommissioned and later replaced with a 20-inch (51 cm) diameter pipeline with its own pipeline inspection gauge (pig) launch and recovery sites for easier inspection. In November 2007, BP Exploration, Alaska (BPXA) pled guilty to negligent discharge of oil, a misdemeanor under the federal Clean Water Act and was fined US$20 million. BP reported to the media that an estimated volume of around 267,000 U.S. gallons (1,010,000 L) of oil was spilled. Soon after the discovery of the leak, the U.S. Department of Transportation ordered BP to test its pipelines using an internal probe called a smart pig. Some of these lines had not been smart-pigged since 1992. BP came up with an Action Plan which was outlined in a letter sent to Thomas Barrett, administrator for pipeline safety for Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). BP’s Steve Marshall detailed measures for pigging or removing oil residue from the pipeline and for various draining and dismantling procedures. Marshall also noted that a special 27 member task force was appointed to address the situation. As a result of news of the shutdown, the price of crude oil on NYMEX jumped US$2.22 a barrel closing at US$76.98 per barrel. Following the Prudhoe Bay pipeline leak in March 2006, due to slow progress in stopping the oil spill, BP was forced to shut down its Prudhoe Bay oil facility, which produced about 2.6% of the United States demand for gasoline. The scenario was a contributing factor for pushing the price of oil to US$77 per barrel in August 2006. In July 2006, BP sent a smart pig through its eastern pipelines, detecting extensive corrosion at several places. Soon after that BP began temporary production shut down of the eastern side, citing the discovery of “unexpectedly severe corrosion”. This reduced the per day production 3 3 from 400,000 barrels (64,000 m ) to 200,000 barrels (32,000 m ). This amounted to reduction in domestic oil supply by 8% at that time. In October 2007, BP was fined US$20 million for the Prudhoe Bay oil spills. BP has paid a US$12 million federal criminal fine, US$4 million in criminal restitution to the state, and US$4 million for Arctic research. BP’s local subsidiary, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., was placed on probation for three years. 3. 2005 Texas City Refinery explosion: In March 2005, BP’s Texas City, Texas refinery, one of its largest refineries, exploded causing 15 deaths, injuring 180 people and forcing thousands of nearby residents to remain sheltered in their homes. A large column filled with hydrocarbon overflowed to form a vapour cloud, which ignited. The explosion caused all the casualties and substantial damage to the rest of the plant. The incident came as the culmination of a series of less serious accidents at the refinery, and the engineering problems were not addressed by the management. Maintenance and safety at the plant had been cut as a cost-saving measure, the responsibility ultimately resting with executives in London. The fallout from the accident continues to cloud BP’s corporate image because of the mismanagement at the plant. There have been several investigations of the disaster, the most recent being tha